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Abstract. Similar to other Eastern European countries, East Germany experienced a 
rapid decline in period fertility rates after the fall of communism. This decline has been 
discussed along the lines of a ‘crisis’ and a ‘adaptation’ to western demographic 
patterns.  The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we discuss the factors which foster 
and hamper a convergence of fertility behavior in East and West Germany.  Secondly, 
we use data from the German micro-census to analyze the fertility patterns of the 
cohorts born 1961-1970.  Major results from our empirical analysis are that East 
Germans who are still childless at unification are more rapid to have their first child in 
the subsequent years than comparable West Germans.  However, regarding second 
parity births, the pattern reverses.  Here, East Germans display a lower transition rate 
than their counterparts in the West.   
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1 Introduction 
Similar to other Eastern European countries, East Germany experienced a drastic and 
raid decline in period fertility rates after the fall of communism (e.g., Kharkova and 
Andreev 2000; Kučera et al. 2000; Frejka and Calot 2001; Philipov 2002).  While there 
were still 180,000 births in 1990, there were only 110,000 a year later, which is a drop 
in the number of births by about 40 percent over the period of a single year.  During this 
time, migration from East to West Germany had reduced the population size in the East 
considerably.  In the period 1989 to 1991 alone, about one million East Germans had 
migrated to the West (Statistisches Bundesamt 2001a).  Massive East to West migration 
has clearly distorted the usefulness of the annual number of births as a fertility indicator.  
However also the total fertility rate (TFR), which standardizes for population size and 
age structure, shows a drastic reduction in fertility.  As can be seen from the Figure 1, 
the East German TFR dropped from 1.5 in 1990 to 1.0 in 1991, reaching its lowest level 
of 0.8 in the years 1992 to 1995.  Since then the East German TFR has steadily 
increased, but has not reached West German fertility levels yet. 
The decline in fertility rates after unification has motivated researchers to conclude that 
the East German society is undergoing a severe social and economic crisis (e.g., 
Eberstadt 1994; Witte and Wagner 1995; Dorbritz 1997).  Mau (1994, p. 206) considers 
the East German society as being in state of ‘anomie’ and the fertility decline a response 
to it.  Eberstadt (1994) believe that the low East German birth rates mirror the state the 
East German economy has been in, where couples do not commit themselves to the 
responsibilities of parenthood in uncertain and unstable times.  Fleischhacker (1994, p. 
43) draws analogues to demographic developments during wartime.  Others have also 
 3 
talked about a ‘birth strike’ (Gebärstreik), in which East German women are assumed to 
forgo parenthood as part of a collective protest (e.g., Adler 1997, p. 6) (for a critical 
discussion, see Dölling et al. 2000).  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Although, there is a consensus that in the immediate time after unification, East 
Germans have been undergoing a fertility crisis, there was some dispute on the general 
course of East German fertility.  In this context, it makes sense to contrast a crisis and 
an adaptation hypothesis (e.g., Mau 1994; Richter 1993; Witte and Wagner 1995; Mau 
and Zapf 1998; Schaich 1998).  Advocates of the ‘crisis hypothesis’ argue that 
unfavorable economic constraints keep East Germany’s fertility below West German 
levels for the foreseeable future.  Supporters of the ‘adaptation hypothesis’ are more 
optimistic in this respect.  They argue that although the economic situation has been 
lagging behind, individuals in the neue Länder (new federal states) are subject to very 
similar institutional constraints in the 1990s as their counterparts in the alte Länder (old 
federal states).  Assuming that family policies, tax regulations and ultimately the entire 
set up of the welfare system are the primary parameters for fertility decisions, one 
would expect that East German fertility converges towards West German levels as soon 
as the economic situation relaxes. 
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Period Fertility Indicators 
Advocates of the ‘crisis hypothesis’ have often taken the drop in annual birth rates as an 
unmistakable sign of an East German fertility crisis (Eberstadt 1994; Witte and Wagner 
1995; Beck-Gernsheim 1997).  This interpretation might have been correct for the time 
around unification, however it is not applicable for the time thereafter.  It is well known 
that period fertility indicators are easily subject to misinterpretation, particularly when 
there are changes in the timing of childbirth (e.g., Bongaarts and Feeney 1998; Kohler 
and Philipov 2001).  A decline in period fertility rates can indicate a decline in lifetime 
fertility, but it might just as well be a postponement of motherhood to higher ages.  This 
aspect is of particular importance in the case of East Germany.  Compared to other 
western European countries, the mean age of women at childbirth was very low in East 
Germany.  In 1989, the mean age at childbirth was 24.7 (Statistisches Bundesamt 1999).  
On the other hand, West Germany displayed --with 28.3 years of age in the year 1989-- 
a rather high age at childbirth in cross-national comparison (Statistisches Bundesamt 
2001a). 
The considerable difference in the age at childbirth between East and West Germans is 
crucial in understanding the ‘East German fertility decline’.  Even if East German 
women, who were childless in 1990, temporarily gave up on childbearing during the 
upheavals of unification, they were generally young enough to postpone childbearing to 
a later phase in their lives without reaching the biological limits of fertility.  In other 
words, what looks like a fertility crisis from the point of period fertility indicators could 
in fact be a postponement of childbirth to West German age levels.  The crucial question 
in this context is, whether the drop in the TFR indicates a ‘fertility crisis’ indeed or 
whether it is part of an ‘adaptation’ to the West German fertility pattern.  In order to 
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address this aspect, one needs to take a cohort perspective on fertility.   
Even though several researchers have noted that timing effects might be an important 
factor for the drop in the TFR (e.g., Conrad et al. 1996, p. 339; Dorbritz 1997, p. 239), it 
has remained unclear what this aspect precisely means for period fertility rates.  
Hitherto, the question of how close East and West German fertility has come has not 
been addressed and, most importantly, it remains unclear how the ‘timing issue’ fits into 
the ‘crisis’ versus ‘adaptation’ hypothesis. 
 
Aim and structure of the paper 
The aim of this paper is compare the fertility behavior of the East and West German 
birth cohorts 1961 to 1970 from the life course perspective (Elder 1985; Mayer 1997).  
By ‘life course perspective’, we understand that we (i) use cohort instead of period data, 
(ii) analyze the transition to the different birth parities separately, and (iii) pay particular 
attention to the way that unification cut into the life courses and the ‘fertility careers’ of 
the respondents.  We picked the birth cohorts 1961-1970 who were respectively ages 
20-29 at unification. They had entered childbearing age before unification, but were still 
at risks of childbirth thereafter, i.e. their behavior should have primarily defined the 
fertility pattern of the 1990s.  Furthermore, members of these cohorts had just entered 
the labor market around the time of unification and their employment careers were 
therefore most severely affected by the economic upheavals during this times 
(Sackmann and Wingens 1996; Mayer et al. 1999).  In other words, if the economic 
situation has affected East German fertility, it should be most pronounced for these 
cohorts. 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  In Part 2 we redefine the ‘crisis’ 
versus ‘adaptation’ hypothesis for the analysis of fertility from the life course 
perspective.  We furthermore discuss some major factors that foster and hamper a 
convergence of fertility behavior in East and West.  Part 3 comprises the empirical 
analysis of the transition pattern to the first and second child using life table techniques.  
Part 4 contains the concluding remarks.  
 
 
2 Theoretical Considerations 
2.1 The Life Course Perspective  
Taking a life course perspective on fertility draws attention to the question of how East 
and West Germans time their first and space their subsequent children.  From this 
perspective, one can talk of an ‘adaptation’ to West German pattern when East Germans 
have their first child at comparable ages as West Germans and when they space their 
subsequent children in a similar manner.   
From previous studies, we know that the percentage of (final) childlessness in West 
Germany is roughly 25 percent and the median age at first birth 28 years of age (e.g., 
Dorbritz and Schwarz 1996; Kreyenfeld and Huinink 2002).  Given that East Germans 
postpone first parenthood above this age level or remain childless to a larger extent, 
there would be an indication of a ‘crisis-related’ fertility behavior.  Vice versa, if they 
have their first child at comparable ages, one could talk of an ‘adaptation’ to West 
German first birth patterns. 
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In order to describe second birth patterns, one usually uses the spacing of the first and 
the second child and we follow this convention here.  In West Germany, roughly 75 
percent of the women who have a first child proceed to have a second child, ‘typically’ 
three years after the first child (e.g., Huinink 1989; Kreyenfeld 2002).  Against this 
background, we define an ‘adaptation’ as a convergence towards this spacing pattern.   
An issue, which we have not address so far is, how unification ‘cut’ into the life courses 
and fertility careers of East and West Germans.  Since fertility behavior in the former 
GDR and FRG differed substantially, particularly regarding the transition pattern to the 
first child, there was a relatively larger fraction of East Germans (of the cohorts 1961-
1970) who had already set up a family by the year 1990.  This involves that the East and 
West German population at risk of childbirth differed at the eve of unification.  If one 
takes the East and West German birth cohorts 1961-1970 and compares their fertility 
behavior after unification, one needs to take into consideration the differences in their 
fertility histories prior to that date.  The implications of this aspect for the East-West 
comparison of fertility is an issue, we will directly address in the empirical analysis in 
Part 4.  In the following, we first discuss major factors, which foster and hamper a 
convergence of fertility behavior in East and West Germany 
 
 
2.2 East-West differences in constraints and attitudes in the 1990s 
Compared to other formerly socialist countries, East Germany has experienced the most 
rapid and radical transformation from a centrally planned to a market economy.  
Although the privatization process was almost completed by the middle of the 1990s, 
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wages and productivity in the eastern states are still behind western levels (Lange and 
Pugh 1998; Schwarze and Wagner 2001).  The unemployment rate in the year 2000 is 
17.4 percent in the East, while it is 7.8 percent in the West (see Figure 2).  The average 
hourly wage of a male East German worker in the industry sector (Arbeiter im 
produzierenden Gewerbe) is 10.50 Euro in the year 2000, or only 69 percent of the 
wage of West German worker who earns 15.13 Euro on average (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2002). Assuming that economic factors are important for fertility, one 
would assign the high unemployment rates and the low wages a key role when 
explaining East-West differences in fertility behavior (e.g., Eberstadt 1994; Witte and 
Wagner 1995). 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Although the economic situation certainly stands out as exceptional, there are other 
East-West differences --in attitudes as well as in institutional constraints-- which have 
outlasted unification.   The most relevant ones for explaining fertility are presumably 
the differences in the public provision of day care, the attitudes towards women’s 
employment and the ones towards family life.  In contrast to the economic situation, 
which is widely expected to suppress East German fertility, these factors could explain 
a more rapid family formation in the East.  In the following, we discuss these aspects in 
more detail.1 
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Public day care 
There was a general believe that the day care system of the former GDR would either be 
privatized in the course of unification or at least drastically cut down.  A ‘lack’ or a 
‘shortage’ of public day care was therefore generally expected (e.g., Nauck and Joss 
1995, p. 25; Rindfuss and Brewster 1996, p. 273; Adler 1997, p. 44; Kopp 2000, p. 
109).  However, the development in East Germany took a different turn.  Throughout 
the 1990s, day care coverage in the new federal lands has remained relatively high.  For 
example, in 1998, the availability ratio for places in the Krippe (care for children ages 
0-3) is almost 40 percent in East, but only 4 percent in the West (see Table 1).  There is 
complete coverage of full-time day care for preschool children (ages 4-7) in the East.  In 
the West, the availability ratio is roughly 20 percent only.   
The reasons for the persisting differences in the provision rate of public day care are 
hard to track down.  However, it is clear that it partially relates to the structure of 
German childcare policy, which is primarily a local responsibility (Kreyenfeld et al. 
2002).  Furthermore, the high coverage of public day care might also be considered as 
an ‘inheritance’ from GDR-times, when a network of public day care centers was 
established (Hank et al. 2001).  In contrast to other family policies of the former GDR, 
which were swiftly abolished in the course of unification, the day care infrastructure 
was taken over by the local communities and was only gradually cut down.  Since birth 
rates and therefore the children to be cared for also declined, provision rates remained 
relatively high.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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Attitudes towards mother’s employment and family life 
Closely related to the still high coverage of public day care are the persisting differences 
in the attitudes towards women’s employment.  Former GDR policies were directed 
towards integrating women into working life, the provision of places in public daycare 
being a major part of it.  Other policies are, for example, maternity leave regulations 
which, by FRG-standards, provided a relatively high income replacement level (Frerich 
and Frey 1993; Höhn and Schwarz 1993; Trappe 1995; Trappe and Rosenfeld 1998; 
Trappe and Rosenfeld 2000).  Although, GDR-family policies had been replaced in 
favor of the West German system in 1990, they had nevertheless instilled very 
pronounced attitudes towards the labor market participation of women, particularly 
regarding those with children.  As a legacy from former socialist times, East German 
women still more often consider women’s employment and economic independence as 
a matter of course than their more traditional counterparts in the West who generally 
believe that women should reduce their working hours when they have small children 
(e.g., Braun et al. 1994; Konietzka and Kreyenfeld 2002). 
It has also been argued that the GDR-system supported a very favorable attitude 
towards children and family-life (Richter 1993, p. 2; Störtzbach 1994, p. 160, Beck-
Gernsheim 1997, p. 63).  East Germans were subject to a repressive system for almost 
half a century, which, so the line of reasoning, they responded to by seeking fulfillment 
in private life (Wendt 1991, p. 266; Frerich and Frey 1993, p. 392; Mau 1994, p. 199).  
Although the political set-up changed with unification, East Germans are still 
considering children and family life as a more essential part of their life courses. 
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Particularly if one undertakes an East-West comparison of fertility, it seems vital to find 
out how persistent preferences are towards changes on the macro level of society.  How 
lasting is the strife for economic independence, being confronted with the new family 
policies and labor market institutions?  Did the cohorts that were socialized during 
GDR-times gradually change their attitudes over their life courses?  Will only the 
subsequent cohorts that were socialized after unification adopt the ‘new’ (but 
traditional) attitudes?  Or are preferences, even across cohorts, rather persistent against 
change?   
Table 2 displays the attitudes towards women’s employment and family life based on 
estimation of the ALLBUS survey (for details on the ALLBUS, see Koch et al. 2001).  
The ALLBUS is a repetitive cross-sectional data set, which does not allow investigating 
changes in attitudes over the life course.  Nevertheless, the table covers the years 1992, 
1996 and 2000 and therefore gives some idea on the persistence of attitudes over time.  
Since we only select respondents of the cohorts 1961-1970, the table also gives some 
idea on changes of attitudes over the life course. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The table supports the view of strong East-West differences in the attitudes towards 
mother’s employment.  In 2000, 65 percent of the respondents (of the birth cohorts 
1961-1970) in the alte Länder agree that a child will suffer when the mother is 
employed.  In the neue Länder, this only applies to 33 percent.  Eight years earlier, 
respectively in the year 1992, the situation was fairly the same.  A more favorable 
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attitude towards mother’s employment does not necessarily influence fertility in a 
positive way.  However, one has to relate it to the public day care system, which 
provides East German women substantially better opportunities to combine child-
rearing and employment.  ‘Work oriented’ women in the East face relatively favorable 
constraints to proceed with their employment career after childbirth and should 
therefore encounter a higher fertility than their counterparts in the West.  Possibly, one 
might even argue that the high coverage of public day care provides East German 
couples completely different opportunities to organize working and family life, 
contributing to a distinct structure of gender relations and employment patterns. 
Compared to the relative persisting differences towards mother’s employment, the 
differences in the attitudes towards family life have converged slightly by the end of the 
1990s.  While in 1992, only 57 percent of the West Germans (of the cohorts 1961-1970) 
stated that they need a family to lead a happy life, this applied to 73 percent of their East 
German counterparts.  Until 2000, the respective fraction has increased to 67 percent in 
the western and to 77 in the eastern states.   
In sum, apart from the glaring differences in the economic situation, there are other 
persisting differences between the alte Länder and the neue Länder.  If one primarily 
focuses on the economic situation (and assumes that high unemployment and low wages 
influence fertility negatively), there would indeed be no reason to expect an ‘adaptation’ 
of East and West German fertility in the 1990s.  On the other hand, a higher coverage of 
children’s day care and a higher preference for children are parameters, which should 
contribute to an earlier family formation in the East, even though unfavorable economic 
parameters will work in the opposite direction.   
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3 Data and method 
3.1 The German micro-census 
In the following, we compare the transition pattern to the first and the second child for 
the cohorts 1961-1970.   For this analysis, we use data from the scientific-use file of the 
1997 micro-census (Schimpl-Neimanns 2002).  The German micro-census is a one-
percent sample of the population living in Germany.  The scientific-use file of the 
micro-census is a 70 percent sample of this sample, respectively a 0.7 percent sample of 
the population living in Germany.  The scientific use file of the micro-census for the 
year 1997 contains roughly 500,000 respondents.   
One of the major advantages using the micro-census, compared to other survey data 
sets, is that it contains a relatively large sample size, which also allows for the analysis 
of single birth cohorts.  Furthermore, the data set is a highly representative sample for 
the population living in Germany. Since respondents are basically legally requested to 
fill in the questionnaire, there is relatively little non-response (Schimpl-Neimanns 
2002).  
The major drawback of the German micro-census is however that it does not survey the 
‘fertility history’ of the respondents.  This means that we have to reconstruct the fertility 
history on the number of children who live in the mother’s household at the date of 
interview.  This involves a variety of problems, most importantly, we are not able to 
identify children who are not living anymore in the household of the respondents.   For 
children who live in their mother’s household, the micro-census provides information 
on the relationship to other cohabiting family members (Familienzusammenhang).  This 
allows us to identify the age at childbirth and the parity of a child.  It is however not 
 14 
possible to distinguish biological children from step- or adopted children.  As noted 
before, children who have already moved out of the parental home or have died can 
neither be identified.  Comparisons with other data set show, however, that women age 
36 and younger, the percentage of children who do no longer live with their mothers is 
relatively small (Kreyenfeld and Huinink 2002; Schimpl-Neimanns 2002).   
The other important drawback of the micro-census is that the most recently available 
publicly available data set is from the year 1997.  Other data sets, such as the German 
Family Survey (Familiensurvey) or the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), provide 
the fertility histories of the respondents up to the year 2000.  These data sets do, 
however, not contain a sufficiently large sample size for a description of the fertility 
patterns in East Germany by single birth cohorts (Kreyenfeld and Huinink 2002).  
German vital statistics would not be instructive here, either, most importantly because 
they do not distinguish by the biological parity of the children.   
Since the micro-census was conducted already in the beginning of the year 1997, we 
can only study the fertility development until the middle of the 1990s. It neither allows 
us to investigate ‘completed’ fertility, since the members of the cohorts 1961-1970 were 
only between the ages 27 to 36 at the date of interview.  Nevertheless, the data set still 
provides a sufficiently long time period after unification to study the timing of first and 
second children. 
As said before, for our analysis we are only selecting women of the birth cohorts 1961-
1970.  Other minor selections are the following: We are only selecting respondents who 
live in private household.  We respectively omit respondents who live in institutions 
such as old people’s homes or asylums.  We do not consider respondents who gave birth 
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to a first child before age 17.  Per cohort of women, there are roughly 600 East and 
2,5000 West German women in our sample (see Table A1, which gives a more detailed 
overview on the sample size). 
 
3.2 Procedure 
Our analysis is purely descriptive; the methodological tools used are survival curves and 
hazard rates, calculated by the life table method.  The first part of the analysis deals with 
the transition to first child, the second one with the transition to the second child.   
For the analysis of first births, the ‘time scale’ is the age of the woman.  In a first step, 
we describe the first birth pattern for single East and West German birth cohorts.  In 
order to investigate the fertility pattern after unification, we then select respondents who 
were childless in 1990 and analyze their transition pattern to the first child.  
For the analysis of second births, the ‘time scale’ is the spacing of the first and the 
second child.  In the first part, we select women who gave first birth before unification 
and we censor the cases in the year 1990.  This investigation basically reveals the 
second birth pattern in the old FRG and GDR.  In the second part, we analyze the 
second birth pattern after unification by selecting women into our sample who had their 
first children after 1990.  In the last step, we perform a separate analysis for respondents 
who had a first child just around the time of unification, i.e. in the years 1987 to 1992.  
In this part, we also discuss the problems involved with comparing the spacing of 
children in East and West Germany without simultaneously taking into account 
differences in the age at first birth.   
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4 Analysis  
4.1 The first child  
Figure 3 displays the survival curves for the transition to the first child for the cohorts 
1961-1970.  Let us first describe the situation for West Germany (dotted line) in order 
to get an idea on the fertility pattern, which the East is expected to converge to.  For the 
birth cohort 1961, the median age at first birth (i.e., the age when 50 percent of the 
respondents have become mothers) is roughly 27 in the former Federal Republic of 
Germany.  At age 35, there are still 25 percent who do not have any children yet.  Given 
that there are only few women who have their first children past age 35, the ‘final’ 
percentage of childless women in the alte Länder is 25 percent, which is in line with 
findings from other studies (see e.g., Dorbritz and Schwarz 1996).  Across cohorts the 
median age at first birth increases.  While it is 27 years of age for the cohort 1961, it is 
age 29 for the cohort 1964.  
In the East, the median age at first birth is about 22 years of age for the birth cohort 
1961.  Since these cohorts were age 29 at unification, they mirror the GDR-fertility 
pattern still.  The subsequent East German cohorts are substantially postponing first 
parenthood, compared to their predecessors.  For example, the median age at first birth 
is age 26 for the birth cohort 1970, which is four years higher than for the birth cohort 
1961.   
A postponement of childbirth to higher ages was largely expected in the course of 
unification.  The intriguing question is whether women in the new federal states are 
postponing first birth above West German age levels and whether they remain childless 
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to a larger extent.  This question can however only partially be addressed based on the 
survival curves.  In order to get a more comprehensive picture, we calculate the survival 
curves for respondents who were still childless at the end of 1990.  Furthermore, we 
estimate the hazard rates for the survival curves displayed in Figure 3. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Transition to the first child after unification 
If one compares the fertility behavior of East and West Germans (of the cohorts 1961-
1970) after unification, one has to take into account that childless East Germans are a 
more highly selected group in 1990.  For the birth cohort 1968, for example, 55 percent 
of the women in the neue Länder are childless in 1990, which applies to 85 percent 
among their counterparts in the alte Länder (Figure 3, Panel 5).  Related to this, one 
could imagine that the relative proportion of infertile respondents, or respondents with a 
strong preference to remain childless is higher in the eastern German sample.  Due to 
such unobserved characteristics, one would expect a slower transition rate to the first 
child for the remaining sample.   
However, one finds the opposite pattern.  As can be depicted from Figure 4 (Panel 4-6), 
East Germans of the cohorts born 1965-1970 are faster having their first child after 
unification than their West German counterparts.2  Figure 5, which displays the 
respective hazard rates, supports this view.  At unification, there is a strong and sizeable 
‘period effect’ of unification in the eastern states.  This effect is very striking compared 
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to the GDR-fertility pattern.  However, if compared to the western pattern, this ‘period 
effect’ is not serious at all.  East German first birth risks stay above West German levels 
even in the immediate years after unification.  For example, for the birth cohort 1968, 
first birth risks are significantly higher at age 23 (respectively in 1991) for women in the 
neue Länder than in the alte Länder.3  This is peculiar if one takes into account that 
children, who were born in 1991, were mostly conceived in 1990, i.e. during a time 
when the social and economic uncertainty was particularly high. 
For the cohorts born 1961-1964, one observes the expected slower transition to the first 
child for the women who live in the new federal lands.  Here, one has to consider that 
less than 25 percent of the members of the East German cohorts were childless at 
unification.  As briefly mentioned above, the expected ratio of childless women is 
around 25 percent for West Germany.  East German cohorts born in 1964 or earlier 
reached a lower level of childlessness in 1990 already (Panel 2 in Figure 3).  This also 
involves that the ratio of childlessness cannot increase above West German levels for 
the cohorts born 1964 or earlier, even if those East German women who were childless 
at unification had completely forgone parenthood in the subsequent years.  This is 
however not the case, i.e. East German women of the cohorts 1961-1964 continued to 
have children in the 1990s.  At censoring (at the end of the year 1996), the final ratio of 
childless women is only slightly more than 10 percent, which is close to the levels of 
childlessness found in the former GDR (see e.g., Dorbritz and Schwarz 1996).   
In sum, for the birth cohorts 1964 and older there is no reason to expect that 
childlessness would increase to West German levels.  For the younger cohorts, it is too 
early to predict a final percentage of childless women.  However, East German are 
faster having their first child after unification.  Against this background, one can very 
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well suspect that the final ratio of childlessness will not increase above western levels. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
 
4.2 The second child 
We now address the transition pattern to the second child.  Panel 1 in Figure 6 displays 
the survival curve for the time prior to 1990.  Women in the former GDR were slightly 
less rapid to have their second child than their counterparts in the former FRG.  The 
final progression ratio is --with 75 percent--, however, fairly the same.  Panel 2 in 
Figure 6 displays the respective hazard rates, which also show the wider spacing of the 
second child in the East.  It should however be noted that although East Germans 
spaced their first and second children further apart, they were nevertheless younger at 
second birth than their counterparts in the FRG. 
Figure 7 displays the second birth pattern for the time after unification.  For this part of 
the analysis, we only selected women who have given birth to their first children after 
1990.  The most glaring aspect this figure reveals is that second birth risks in the eastern 
states basically collapse after unification.  The hazard rates are wide under West 
German levels.  The survival curves suggest that five years after the birth of the first 
child, there are still 70 percent who do not have a second child yet.  Among the West 
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German sample, this amounts to only 45 percent.  In other words, before unification 
there had been minor East-West differences in the spacing of the first and the second 
child.  After unification, the ‘spacing behavior’ in the new federal lands strongly differs 
from the one in the old federal lands.  East German women are exceptionally reluctant 
to have a second child. 
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
[Figure7 about here] 
 
Transition to the second child by ‘first child cohorts’ 
In the next step, we display the transition pattern to the second child for ‘first child 
cohorts’.  By ‘first child cohorts’, we understand a group of women who had given birth 
to their first children in the same year.  By this procedure, we can more clearly show 
how unification affected the spacing pattern.  
Before we analyze the spacing pattern of different ‘first child cohorts’, we discuss the 
problems involved with this procedure.  Since we are selecting women who had their 
first child in a particular year and since we are only dealing with the birth cohorts 1961-
1970, we automatically select women who had their first child at a particular age.  For 
example, when we select women who had given birth to the first child in 1990, these 
women were at a maximum age 29 at first birth.  The sample therefore comprises 
women who --by West German standards-- had a first child relatively early in life.4  
Since the age at first birth has some impact on the spacing of the second child (see e.g., 
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Huinink 1989; Kreyenfeld 2002), there is some bias involved here.  We do, however, 
not take this aspect into account.  Neither do we address East-West differences in the 
age at first birth.   
Let us first describe the spacing pattern of women who had their first child before 
unification, i.e. who had their first child in the years 1987, 1988 or 1989.  Unification 
basically ‘cut’ into the fertility careers of these women and we assume a decline in 
second birth risks at unification.  Since women in the former GDR were, however, 
relatively young at first birth, there might be a ‘recuperation’ of second birth in the 
period thereafter.  In other words, particularly women who just had a first child before 
unification might display a very wide spacing of the first and the second child. 
However, this view is not completely supported by our analysis.  As can be seen from 
Figure 8 and Figure 9, East German women display an astonishingly low transition rate 
to the second child.  There is drastic ‘period effect’ at unification and the hazard rates 
do not --contrary our assumption-- ‘recuperate’ at a later stage.  For example, for the 
respondents who had their first child in 1989, second births risks are substantially below 
West German levels in the years 1990-1993 (i.e., when the first child is ages 1-4), but 
also thereafter they remain lower. 
Let us now turn to the second birth pattern of women who had their first child after 
unification, i.e. in the years 1990, 1991 and 1992.  For these women, it is difficult to 
project a second birth pattern.  On the one hand, they might have most harshly been 
affected by the upheavals of unification, since they had just entered the phase of being 
at risk of second birth in the early 1990s.  On the other hand, they already had their first 
child in unstable times and might therefore be less reluctant to have a second child then 
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as well.   
As can be depicted from Panel 4 to Panel 6 in Figure 9, the first assumption applies.  
East Germans who have given birth to their first child in 1990, 1991 or 1992 display a 
much slower transition rate to the second child than their counterparts in the West. 
In sum, East German women are considerably more reluctant to have second children 
after unification.  The cohorts under consideration are still of childbearing age at the 
date of censoring and therefore one cannot rule out that there will eventually be a 
‘recuperation’ of second births at the end of the 1990s.  This would, however, involve 
and enormous and unprecedented increase in the spacing of second children.   
 
[Figure 8 about here] 
[Figure 9 about here] 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
East Germany has frequently been termed as an ideal ‘natural experiment’ to investigate 
how a population responds to a rapid change of institutional constraints and how well 
and how fast it adjusts to the new conditions (e.g., Witte and Wagner 1995, p. 387).  
The two very contrasting societies of the FRG and the GDR have been united within a 
common institutional framework overnight.  This common institutional framework was, 
with only small exceptions, the one of the former West Germany.  Given that East 
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Germans are now subject to similar institutional constraints, one would expect a 
convergence of East and West German fertility patterns, as soon as the economic 
situation in the eastern states reaches parity with the one in the western states.  In this 
context, the ‘crisis’ versus ‘adaptation’ hypothesis have been put forward as two 
contrasting scenarios for the fertility development in post-communist East Germany.  
While the ‘crisis hypothesis’ suggests that the economic situation in the East will 
dominate East German behavior and continuously push fertility below western levels, 
the ‘adaptation hypothesis’ more strongly focuses on the similarities in institutional 
constraints and projects a convergence of East and West German behavior. 
In the first part of the paper, we discussed the factors, which should, despite the legal 
and political unification of the formerly two countries, contribute to persistent East-
West differences in behavior.  On the one hand, the economic situation is still lagging 
behind and should contribute to continuously lower fertility rates.  On the other hand, 
there are aspects, such as a higher availability of public day care and a higher preference 
for children and family life, which should foster family formation. 
In our empirical analysis, which was conducted with the 1997 micro-census, we 
analyzed the transition to the first and second child for the cohorts 1961-1970, using life 
table techniques.  Our major finding is that East Germans who were childless in 1990 
are faster to have a first child in the subsequent years than their counterparts in the 
West.  Counter to general expectations, women in the new federal states of Germany are 
still slightly younger at first birth than women in the old federal lands.  However, for 
second parity births the pattern reverses.  East Germans are substantially less likely to 
have a second child and equally important, the relatively low second birth risks are not 
restricted to the years immediately after unification, but they have also remained low 
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thereafter. 
One main conclusion one can draw from this is that it is highly problematic to 
summarize the fertility behavior in post-unification East Germany under general 
concepts such as ‘crisis’ and ‘adaptation’.  The parity and cohort specific analysis, we 
conducted in this paper, shows a very divergent pattern for first and second births.  
While East Germans still have the first child at younger ages, which might be 
compatible with the idea of an ‘adaptation’, the second birth behavior seems ‘crisis-
related’, if compared to the West German pattern.   
The paper has to leave a lot of issues unresolved, though.  Firstly, we used the West 
German fertility pattern as a benchmark.  In line with other studies, we characterized 
East German fertility as ‘crisis related’ when it lacks behind West German levels.  
Obviously, there is little reason to believe that the West German fertility pattern is a 
particularly ‘normal’ and ‘uncomplicated’ reference group.  West Germany’s fertility 
rates have been one of the lowest in Europe.  If East German fertility converges towards 
the West German levels, it converges towards an exceptionally low one.  The most 
intriguing question in this context is which are the parameters, which make East 
Germans postpone first parenthood to high West German ages, and which are the 
factors that suppress second births?  Possibly, one could argue that economic constraints 
are more important for the decision to have a larger family, while first birth decisions 
might be less affected by them.  However, in order to answer these questions, a micro-
level analysis, which links economic parameters to fertility decisions, is ultimately 
needed. 
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Tables & Graphs 
 
Table 1: Availability ratio of public day care 
 West Germany East Germany 
 1990 1994 1998  1990 1994 1998 
Krippe (ages 0-3) 2 2 3  56 41 36 
Kindergarten (ages 4-6)*) n.a. 14 19  n.a. 113 129 
Hort (ages 7-10) 5 5 6  88 58 48 
Notes: (1) Availability ratio: available day care places per 100 children of an age group (2) 
n.a.=not available (3) *) only full-time care  
Source: Deutsches Jugendinstitut (1993, 1998); Statistisches Bundesamt (2001b) 
 
Table 2: Attitudes towards family life and female employment, in percent  
 West Germany East Germany 
 1992 1996 2000  1992 1996 2000 
Child suffers when mother employed? *)        
  Agree fully 28 30 28  16 19 15 
  Agree partially 35 37 37  23 27 21 
  Disagree partially 24 22 23  33 25 41 
  Disagree fully 10 9 12  25 26 22 
  Don’t know 3 3 1  3 3 1 
Number of valid cases 492 540 402  208 195 220 
        
Needs family to be happy? **)         
  Needs family 57 62 67  73 77 77 
  Alone as happy 27 25 25  16 11 13 
  Alone happier 2 2 1  1 3 1 
  Don’t know 14 12 7  10 10 9 
Number of valid cases 492 541 402  207 195 220 
Notes: (1) For this analysis, we only used respondents of the birth cohorts 1961-1970. (2) *) The exact 
wording of the question is as follows: A small child is most likely to suffer when the mother is working. 
[Ein Kleinkind wird sicherlich darunter leiden, wenn seine Mutter berufstätig ist.] (3) **) The exact 
wording of the question is as follows: Do you think it requires a family to be happy?  Or do you think that 
it is possible to be just as happy by oneself? [Glauben Sie, daß man eine Familie braucht, um wirklich 
glücklich zu sein, oder glauben Sie, man kann alleine genauso glücklich sein?]   
Source: ALLBUS 1992, 1996, 2000 (own estimates) 
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Figure 1: Total fertility rate in East and West Germany 1980-1999 
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2001a) 
 
Figure 2: Unemployment rate in East and West Germany 1991-2000 
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2002) 
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Figure 3: Transition to the first child, survival curves 
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Notes: The arrow indicates the year of unification. 
Source: German micro-census 1997 (own estimates) 
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Figure 4: Transition to the first child, survival curves, women who are childless in 1990 
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Source: German micro-census 1997 (own estimates) 
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Figure 5:  Transition to the first child, hazard rates 
Panel 1: Cohort 1961 
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Notes: The arrow indicates the year of unification. 
Source: German micro-census 1997 (own estimates) 
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Figure 6: Transition to the second child before unification (right censored 1990) 
Panel 1: survival curves Panel 2: hazard rates 
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Notes: This analysis only covers respondents of the birth cohorts 1961-1970 who had a first child before 
1990. 
Source: German micro-census 1997 (own estimates) 
 
Figure 7: Transition to the second child after unification  
Panel 1: survival curves Panel 2: hazard rates 
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Notes: This analysis only covers respondents of the birth cohorts 1961-1970 who had a first child after 
unification. 
Source: German micro-census 1997 (own estimates) 
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Figure 8: Transition to the second child by year of first birth, survival curves 
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Notes: The arrow indicates the year of unification. 
Source: German micro-census 1997 (own estimates) 
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Figure 9: Transition to the second child by year of first birth, hazard rates 
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(First child age 3 at unification) 
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Source: German micro-census 1997 (own estimates) 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Sample size scientific-use file of the German micro-census, only women of 
the birth cohorts 1961-1970 who live in private households 
 West Germany East Germany 
Cohort Respondents First births Second births  Respondents First births Second births 
1961 3261 2424 1685  776 708 453 
1962 3196 2252 1510  771 684 436 
1963 3478 2425 1620  799 696 415 
1964 3330 2178 1322  747 659 363 
1965 3395 2095 1192  689 585 289 
1966 3309 1837 948  676 536 228 
1967 3142 1588 800  589 458 211 
1968 3183 1399 625  601 439 166 
1969 2982 1193 507  578 360 127 
1970 2688 833 327  558 296 78 
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Notes 
 
1  It is worth noting that there are also some differences in the educational system.  In the East, 
primary school is still slightly shorter.  In some East German states, the Abitur (A-level) only 
requires 12 years of education, while in most West German states 13 years are compulsory (von 
Below 2002). Furthermore, the percentage of college graduates is slightly lower, which can 
partially be explained by the lower density of universities and a smaller fraction of East Germans 
taking the Abitur. 
2  The same applies to the cohorts 1967 and 1969, which are not displayed here. 
3  They are significantly different on the 95-percent level.  For improved readability of the graphs, 
we did however not display the confidence intervals.  
4  A similar issue applies to the previous analysis (see Figure 6 and Figure 7).   
